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#2A-V 15/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF BUFFALO. 
Respondent, 
-and CASE NO—U-8017 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE. COUNTY. 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES. LOCAL 650. 
Charging Party. 
SARA 0. NAPLES, ESQ. (FLORA MILLER SLIWA. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
SARGENT & REPKA. P.C. (NICHOLAS J. SARGENT, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The charge herein was filed by the American Federation 
of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 650 (Local 
650). It recites that the Common Council of the City of 
Buffalo adopted a resolution on January 22, 1985, designed 
to resolve a negotiation deadlock between Local 650 and the 
City of Buffalo (City), which, inter alia, provided: 
4. HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE 
a. Employees who voluntarily waive dental 
coverage shall receive $12.50 per month 
(up to a maximum of $150.00 per year), 
payable on December 15. 
b. Employer may seek bids for medical and 
dental coverage or may self-insure, in 
10285 
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accordance with finding of Factfinder on 
Issue No. 7.1/ 
Local 650 then complained that it was unlawful for the Common 
Council to have adopted this language and, on March 5, 1985, the 
Common Council rescinded it. The charge states that the City 
considers the reseission—a--ma-1-1-irtyand"has assextedirts -freedom 
to implement the two rescinded provisions . . . ." Moreover, 
according to the charge, the City has implemented the first of 
the provisions. The charge concludes: 
Based upon the foregoing, the respondent has 
interfered with, restrained and coerced 
employees in the unit appropriate for 
collective bargaining represented by 
Charging Party, and has also failed to 
negotiate in good faith with the recognized 
representative, the Charging Party. 
The record before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
consists of a stipulation of facts and joint exhibits. It 
includes the allegations, but not the conclusion, contained in 
the charge. It does, however, indicate that the date of the 
first legislative resolution was January 14, 1985, and not 
January 22, 1985. 
i/That finding states: 
Such alternate coverage will pay the full cost of all 
treatment, services, or other benefits as are now 
enjoyed under the present plans, and it will not add 
to the employee's health costs for medical. 
Further, if the savings with the bidding or 
self-insurance process exceeds 25% of the current 
total premium, the EMPLOYER shall apply 10% of these 
savings to improving health insurance benefits in 
areas agreed to by both parties. 
. Iti286 
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The stipulation also states relevant facts not contained 
"") in the charge. Local 650 and the City had been parties to a 
collective bargaining agreement covering the period July 1, 
1982 through June 30, 1984. After an impasse was reached 
between them in their negotiations for a successor agreement, 
this Board appointed a mediator and then a fact finder. The 
fact finder issued a report which, inter alia, recommended 
the changes in health and life insurance that were 
subsequently incorporated into the January 14, 1985 
resolution of the Common Council. The fact finder's report 
was not accepted and the City's mayor forwarded a copy of 
that report to the Common Council with his recommendation 
that it be adopted except for four modifications. His 
proposed modifications did not address the health and life 
insurance recommendation of the fact finder. 
The Common Council conducted public hearings on the 
merits of the mayor's proposal. Local 650 participated in 
the legislative hearing addressing the four issues raised by 
the mayor and raising a fifth issue on its own. However, it 
too did not address the health and life insurance 
recommendation. 
At the legislative hearing, both the City and Local 650 
informed the Common Council that their understanding of 
County of Niagara v. Newman. 104 A.D.2d 1. 17 PERB §7021 (4th 
Dep't 1984). precluded the Common Council from diminishing 
^ any benefits contained in the parties' previous collective 
10287 
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bargaining agreement. It is stipulated that although Local 
650 did not specifically address the proposal of the fact 
finder relating to health and life insurance, it did not 
agree to the change imposed by the Common Council. 
In its Memorandum of Law to the ALJ, Local 650 stated 
that the issue was: 
May a legislative determination, imposed 
pursuant to §209(3)(e) . of the Civil Service 
Law, change the terms and conditions of an 
expired collective bargaining agreement, 
whether or not to the benefit of the 
bargaining unit employees? 
It argued that this question must be answered in the 
negative. Noting that this Board stated in County of 
Niagara. 16 PERB 1f3071 (1983), at p. 3116 n. 9,—/ that an 
employee organization "may consent to the issuance of a 
legislative determination . . .", it argues that this should 
be understood to mean: 
[T]he consent of the employee organization 
is to the terms of the legislative 
determination, not the issuance thereof. 
Thus, any participation in interest 
arbitration [or legislative hearing] to 
resolve an impasse in negotiations by an 
employee organization, does not constitute 
consent by the organization to the interest 
arbitration [or legislative hearing]. The 
consent of the employee organization must be 
to the arbitration award [or legislative 
determination] becoming effective. 
The Citv, in its Memorandum of Law to the ALJ, argued 
that Local 650's participation on the merits in the 
•i/confirmed. County of Niagara v. Newman, supra. 
10288 
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n 
legislative hearing constituted a consent to the Common 
) Council's exercise of jurisdiction over the negotiation 
deadlock. It further argued that the disposition of the 
health and life insurance issue by the Common Council did not 
diminish any benefits provided by the parties' expired 
agreement. Finally, it argued that, having resolved the 
deadlock by its legislative determination of January 14, 
1985, it lacked the power to reopen the matter and change 
3/ that legislative determination.— 
The ALJ held that Local 650 did not consent to a 
legislative determination. She found that it had 
consistently taken the position that §209-a.l(e) of the 
v ) Taylor Law precluded the Common Council from imposing changes 
in contractual benefits and concluded that its participation 
at the hearing by making a presentation on the merits of some 
of the issues did not constitute a waiver. She further found 
that it did not waive its right to object to a violation of 
§209-a.l(e) by objecting to some but not other changes made 
by the Common Council in its legislative determination. 
The ALJ determined that the City's argument that the 
health and life insurance changes do not diminish benefits 
afforded under the expired agreement is irrelevant because 
1/The City made an additional argument, to wit, that the 
prior collective bargaining agreement between the parties had 
not expired. This argument, like the others made by the City, 
' J was rejected by the ALJ. It was raised in the exceptions, but 
was withdrawn by the City during oral argument. 
10289 
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§209-a.l(e) makes no distinction between changes which may be 
beneficial and changes which may be to the detriment of unit 
employees. Finally, she rejected the proposition that the 
Common Council was without power to rescind its determination 
of January 14, 1985. / 
Having rejected the City's arguments, the ALJ found that 
it violated §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law "when, through the 
action of its legislative body and its implementation by the 
executive branch, it changed the terms of the health 
insurance provisions of the parties' expired collective 
bargaining agreement in and after January 1985." The ALJ 
also found the City's conduct to be violative of §209-a.l(d) 
4/ 
of the Taylor Law.— 
The matter now comes to us on the exceptions of the 
City. It reasserts the positions argued before the ALJ: — 
(1) Local 650's participation on the merits in the 
legislative hearing constituted a consent to the Common 
Council's exercise of jurisdiction over the negotiation 
deadlock; (2) its conduct in reliance upon the legislative 
4/The ALJ determined that the City's conduct did not 
violate §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. Local 650 has filed no 
exception to this part of her decision. 
li/The City had previously made a motion that the matter be 
remanded for further evidence. Finding that the proffered 
evidence "would at most have some relevance to the remedial 
order", we denied the motion, but left open the possibility that 
additional information might be solicited, should we affirm the 
ALJ's finding of a violation. City of Buffalo, 19 PERB 1P005 
(1986). The possible need for such a reopening of the record has 
been resolved by an additional stipulation of the parties. 
10290 
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determination of January 14, 1985 was sanctioned by the Taylor 
Law; (3) the subsequent legislative determination is of no 
legal consequence because, having performed its Taylor Law 
function under §209.3(e) of the Taylor Law, the Common Council 
was functus officio. The City also argues (4) that its conduct 
was consistent with the legislative determination even if the 
jurisdiction of the Common Council had been limited by the 
mutual expressions of the City and Local 650 before the Common 
Council that it "lacked the power to diminish any of the 
benefits contained in the previous collective bargaining 
agreement." This argument is based upon the proposition that 
the changes relating to health and life insurance did not 
diminish any such benefits. 
Since the ALJ issued her decision herein. Local 650 has 
changed attorneys. Its current attorney does not rely upon the 
arguments which persuaded the ALJ. According to his analysis, 
the City violated §209-a.l(d) and (e) of the Taylor Law because 
it did not accept the legislative determination of March 5, 
1985. Local 650's attorney contends that the March 5, 1985 
legislative action of the Common Council was a valid exercise 
of legislative authority by the Common Council and that it 
effectively rescinded the authorization for changes in health 
and life insurance contained in its earlier determination. 
Thus, according to Local 650's attorney, we need not reach the 
, s issue whether the earlier determination was a proper one by 
reason of having been consented to by Local 650. 
10291 
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At the oral argument. Local 650's attorney stated that he 
reads the charge as being limited to the conduct of the 
executive branch of the City. He reasoned that the filing of 
the charge a week after the second legislative determination 
shows that it complained about the failure of the City's 
executive branch to comply with the second legislative 
determination. Local 650's current attorney has not attempted 
to amend the charge; rather, he has merely indicated his 
interpretation of it.-
Our review of the record persuades us that the charge was 
properly understood by the ALJ. On its face, it complains 
about the conduct recited, which includes the first 
legislative determination. Furthermore, Local 650's brief to 
the ALJ, which was drafted by the attorney who had prepared 
the charge, was clearly directed to the events of January 14, 
1985, and immediately thereafter. Accordingly, we treat the 
current Local 650 argument as an alternative theory to justify 
relief. We therefore find it necessary to address the issues 
raised by the City's exceptions to the decision of the ALJ, 
.i/tle is aware, however, that if we accept his 
interpretation, we would be compelled to reverse the decision 
of the ALJ insofar as it finds a violation with respect to the 
action of the Common Council on January 14, 1985; with respect 
to the executive branch of the City between January 14, 1985 
and March 5, 1985; and with respect to the second paragraph of 
the health and life insurance resolution completely. The first 
two of these findings of the ALJ would have to be reversed 
because they deal with matters not encompassed by the charge, 
the last because there is no evidence that the City ever 
effectuated the second paragraph of the health and life 
insurance resolution. 
10292 
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which dealt with Local 650's original theory as well as those 
raised by Local 650's current theory. 
The first issue raised by the City's exceptions is 
whether Local 650's participation, on the merits, in the 
legislative hearing waived its right to object to changes 
wrought by the legislative determination. In County of 
Niagara, supra, we noted (at p. 3116 n. 9) that 
an employee organization may consent to the 
issuance of a legislative determination by a 
legislative body or to a determination by a 
public arbitration panel, in which event it would 
waive its right to require the public employer to 
abide by the terms of the expired agreement. 
We elaborated on this point in City of Kingston. 18 PERB 
1F3036, at p. 3076 (1985), saying that participation by a union 
on the merits "might constitute a waiver of its objection to 
the process." We noted that where a union does not waive its 
7/ 
objection to the process,- that process "could be allowed 
to run its course up to, but not including, the point where 
the award is put into effect," because that last step would be 
contingent upon the union's consent. Finding that this would 
give a union an unfair advantage over a public employer by 
knowing the terms of the award before having to decide whether 
to be bound by it, we concluded that it would not effectuate 
the purposes of the Taylor Law for us to activate that process 
Z/ln that case we were dealing with the process of 
interest arbitration, but the principle enunciated applies 
equally to legislative determinations. 
10293 
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if there had not been an earlier waiver by the union. These 
decisions make clear that a union must make its position known 
at the commencement of the legislative hearing process. It 
may not participate in the process on the merits and then 
await the results of the process before deciding whether and 
8/ 
to what extent to be bound by it.~ 
Here, the parties' stipulation expressly states that 
Local 650 joined with the City in advising the Common Council 
that it "lacked the power to diminish any of the benefits 
contained in the previous collective bargaining agreement." 
We understand this to constitute a joint submission by the 
parties to the Common Council, authorizing it to make changes 
in the prior collective bargaining agreement to the extent 
. . . . 9/ that such changes do not diminish benefits.-
£./lf, however, a public employer chooses to activate 
the process on its own, notwithstanding a union's objection 
to the process, it takes the risk of letting the union decide 
which terms of a legislative determination it will accept. 
^This joint submission was based upon the parties' 
understanding of County of Niagara v. Newman, supra, that 
such was the power of the Common Council as a matter of law. 
The Appellate Division decision stated that a legislative 
determination could not diminish employee rights. That 
statement was appropriate on the facts of Niagara. The 
changes wrought in that case had diminished employee rights 
(See footnote 2 of the ALJ decision at 15 PERB ir4649 (1982). 
The statute goes further and prohibits all changes 
except, as noted in our Niagara County decision, where the 
union consents to the process. The limited consent here, 
embodied in the joint submission to the Common Council, is 
valid, notwithstanding its genesis as an overly strict 
reading of the the court's decision. 
Board - U-8017 -11 
This brings us to the question whether the changes 
authorized by the legislative determination of January 14, 
1985 constituted a diminution of benefits. The first 
modification permits unit employees to sell their dental 
insurance coverage to the City for a specified price. The 
choice whether or not to do so was left with the individual 
employee. On the record before us we do not find that the 
City diminished contractual benefits under the expired 
collective bargaining agreement by affording this option to 
unit employees. 
The second modification permits the City to seek 
alternative medical and dental coverage or to self-insure in 
accordance with the finding of the fact finder. The 
language of this modification, especially with its 
incorporation of the conditions imposed by the fact finder, 
does not establish a diminution of contractual benefits. As 
no such substitute insurance program has been introduced, it 
is premature to ascertain whether an actual change has done 
so. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the ALJ and 
hold that the City did not violate §209-a.l(d) or (e) of the 
Taylor law by virtue of the legislative determination of 
sJanuar'"" 14 1985 or the action of the executive branch of 
the City pursuant thereto. This leaves the question whether 
the City's conduct became violative of the Taylor Law after 
the legislative determination of March 5, 1985. The City 
10295 
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argues that the second determination is a nullity because 
the Common Council was performing a special Taylor Law 
function rather than a normal legislative function when it 
issued its first determination. According to the City's 
executive, the Common Council had no inherent legislative 
authority to reverse itself in this connection and none may 
be found in the Taylor Law. 
We agree that a legislative determination under 
§209.3(e) is a special Taylor Law function rather than a 
normal legislative one. The purpose of such a determination 
is to afford finality where the parties reach a deadlock in 
negotiations.— It does not follow, however, that no 
changes may be made by the legislative body. It is useful 
to analogize such legislative determinations to arbitration 
awards because, in arbitration, too, there is a public 
policy that an award should provide finality in the 
resolution of disputes.— 
AP-/The provisions of the Taylor Law relating to 
legislative hearings and legislative determinations were 
added by L. 1969. c. 24, §6. They were recommended by the 
Taylor Committee in a part of a report entitled "Finality in 
Impasse Procedures." (Governor's Committee on Public 
Employee Relations. Report of January 23. 1969. pp. 3-5.) 
After enactment, their significance was noted in the 1969 
report of the Select Joint Legislative Committee on Public 
Employee Relations (Legislative Document 1969 - Number 14) 
as "relating to the finality of agreements. . . . " 
il/This is expressed in the narrowness of the 
opportunity for judicial review of an arbitration award 
afforded by CPLR §7511(b). 
10296 
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CPLR §7509 permits the modification of an award by an 
arbitrator. There are two significant restrictions. The 
first is that the modification must be upon the application 
of a party within 20 days of the delivery of the award to 
the applicant. The second, by cross-reference to CPLR 
§7511(c), is that the grounds for modification are limited 
to (1) a miscalculation of figures or mistake in the 
description of a person, thing, or property. (2) elimination 
of a part of an award dealing with a matter not submitted to 
the arbitrator, and, (3) a correction as to a matter of form 
not affecting the merits of the controversy. 
We find that similar restrictions are appropriate for 
modifications of a legislative determination. They permit 
the prompt correction of gross errors while reasonably 
protecting the finality principle. Applying them here, we 
find the Common Council acted promptly to modify a 
determination in response to an application by Local 650 
which was made only two days after that determination. We 
further find that the grounds for the modification of the 
first legislative determination was that the Common Council 
was persuaded by Local 650 that the action it had earlier 
taken went beyond the power bestowed upon it by the parties' 
submission in that it diminished contract benefits. 
This finding is complicated by our earlier conclusion 
that the record before us does not support a determination 
that the change diminishes employee benefits. The test in 
10297 
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reaching that earlier conclusion was our own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence, with the burden of proof 
falling upon the charging party. With respect to the issues 
raised by the modification of the legislative determination, 
the test is whether the legislative body acted arbitrarily. 
In this sense, a legislative determination issued upon a 
submission is like an arbitration award that may not be set 
aside because of a mistake of fact or law unless the error is 
12/ 
so gross as to establish fraud or misconduct.— Such is 
not the case here. 
Having found the second legislative determination to be 
binding upon the parties, our analysis of Local 650's original 
charge brings us to the same place as its current attorney 
does with his new theory. Does the failure of the City to 
comply with the second determination constitute a violation of 
§209-a.l(d) or (e) of the Taylor Law? 
Clearly, the City's failure to comply with the second 
legislative determination does not constitute a violation of 
CSL §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law, which prohibits a public 
employer from changing the terms of an expired agreement until 
a new agreement is negotiated. Here, the change in health and 
life insurance that was effectuated by the City took place 
pursuant to the legislative determination of January 14, 1985, 
12/See Dalian v. Luchs, 92 A.D.2d 537 (2d Dep' t 1983). 
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and, as we have held, that determination superseded the 
expired agreement because it was authorized by the parties' 
submission to the Common Council. The City's executive made 
no further change after the legislative determination of 
March 5, 1985, and its refusal to reorder the status quo 
ante does not violate §209-a.l(e) of the Taylor Law. 
The question whether the City's failure to comply with 
the second legislative determination constitutes a violation 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law requires a different 
answer. For these purposes the legislative determination 
should be seen as the equivalent of a collective bargaining 
agreement.^-' Thus, if the charge is seen as an attempt 
to enforce the terms of that agreement equivalent, there 
14/ 
would be no violation.— But we do not see the charge 
this way. Rather, we see it as complaining that the City 
had repudiated the legislative determination. 
Both this Board and the courts have distinguished 
between charges which complain that a party has failed to 
comply with the terms of an agreement and charges which 
H/ln a decision not appealed to this Board, the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
has held that a legislative determination which resolves a 
negotiation deadlock would be the equivalent of a collective 
bargaining agreement for the purposes of contract bar. 
County of Erie. 8 PERB 1T4007 (1975). In County of Suffolk. 
12 PERB 1P014 (1979), we held that an interest arbitration 
award is a substitute for an agreement. 
14,/See §205.5(d) of the Taylor Law and St. Lawrence 
County, 10 PERB 1T3058 (1977). 
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complain that a party has repudiated an agreement. For 
example, in Jefferson County Board of Supervisors, 6 PERB 
1P031 (1973), we were confronted with a charge complaining 
that a public employer refused to fund the second year of a 
two-year contract. Noting, at p. 3064. that the charge did 
not present "a dispute as to interpretation of a term of a 
contract, where the employer acts under a claim of contractual 
privilege," this Board found a violation in that the employer 
was repudiating its agreement. The employer appealed our 
decision, arguing that we lack jurisdiction because the 
dispute involved only a legal question as to the 
interpretation of the agreement. The Appellate Division 
rejected this argument, holding that we had jurisdiction over 
the complaint that the employer repudiated the agreement by 
15/ 
refusing to appropriate money to finance it. 
More recently, an ALJ dismissed a charge complaining 
that a school district had refused to pay an agreed-upon 
salary increase in violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Taylor 
Law. The District had denied that there was such an agreement 
and the ALJ said: "the dispute is really one that involves the 
interpretation and enforcement of an agreement . . . . " 
Copiague UFSD. 13 PERB 1f4542, at p. 4587 (1980). We reversed 
UJ/Jefferson County Board of Supervisors v. PERB, 44 
A.D.2d 893, 7 PERB tf7009 (4th Dep't 1974). The Appellate 
Department reversed another aspect of the decision of this 
Board, aff'd, 36 N.Y.2d 534, 8 PERB 1f7008 (1975). 
1C3D0 
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this decision on the ground that the District's denial of the 
existence of an agreement raised the issue whether it was 
repudiating an agreement. We said (13 PERB 1F3081, at p. 3129 
[1980]): 
The repudiation of a final agreement is a 
violationof the "duty tonegotiate in go0<3 
faith [footnote omitted]. It is clear that if 
there are to be harmonious and cooperative 
relations between public employers and the 
organizations representing their employees, 
neither side may be permitted to repudiate its 
agreements. Such a repudiation, if it 
occurred here, would be inconsistent with the 
requirements of good faith negotiations. 
The principle enunciated in these cases applies here. 
Accordingly, we find that the City has violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Taylor law by repudiating its obligation — imposed by the 
second legislative determination, which rescinded the 
first determination with respect to health and life insurance 
benefits — to cease and desist from offering unit employees 
the opportunity to sell their dental insurance coverage to 
it. We also find a violation with respect to the modification 
authorized by the first legislative determination dealing with 
alternative medical and dental insurance coverage. It is 
irrelevant that the City has only effectuated the first part 
of the January 14, 1985 determination. It has repudiated the 
second legislative determination, which for these purposes is 
the equivalent of a collective bargaining agreement, with 
respect to both parts. 
Board - U-8017 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the City to cease and desist 
from repudiating the determination of 
16 / 
the Common Council of March 5, 1 9 8 5 . — 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany, New York 
^L^CJZ TPV^< 
rHarold R. Newmaja^ Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
16/This remedial order is circumscribed. We find it 
appropriate in view of the narrow scope of the violation found 
herein and of the stipulation submitted by the parties to us ii 
lieu of a reopening of the record. See footnote 5 supra. 
#2B-4/15/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD. 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO. U-7842 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 830, AFSCME, LOCAL 1000, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
W. KENNETH CHAVE, JR., ESQ. (KEVIN P. McDERMOTT, ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
ROEMER AND FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (JOHN R. MINEAUX, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Town of 
Hempstead (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) that the Town violated §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law. 
The violation found was that the Town Superintendent of 
Sanitation told a unit employee, whose request for a task 
reassignment had been denied by his supervisor, that the 
matter would have been handled differently if the employee 
had not brought the president of the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 830, AFSCME, Local 1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) 
with him when he made his request,— 
!/The ALJ dismissed all the other specifications of 
the charge; no exceptions were filed by CSEA. 
10303 
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The Town argues that the statement attributed to the 
2/ Superintendent- was of no consequence and therefore could 
not constitute a violation of the Taylor Law. The Town's 
reason for this proposition is the absence of evidence that 
the Superintendent had any input into the supervisory decision 
to deny the request or that he knew why the request was 
denied. The Town further argues, relying upon New Paltz CSD, 
17 PERB ir3108 (1984), that, in any event, the Superintendent's 
statement should be excused. 
In New Paltz, we found that statements by a 
representative of a public employer which might, under other 
circumstances, have established an intention to interfere 
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights 
guaranteed by the Taylor Law. did not do so because they were 
an uncontrolled personal response to a provocation. The 
record herein affords no reason to apply the reasoning in New 
Paltz here. 
The Town's argument that the Superintendent's statement 
is of no consequence assumes that the issue here involves the 
truth of the statement that the unit employee would have been 
afforded different treatment if a union official had not been 
brought in. Whether the presence of a union official did in 
2/There was a conflict between the testimony of the 
Superintendent and the unit employee as to what was said by 
the Superintendent. The ALJ resolved the credibility issue 
in favor of the unit employee. We find no reason to 
disturb this conclusion. 
10304 
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fact make a difference is not of the essence. The statement 
itself communicated to the employee that some requests would 
be given less favorable treatment by the Town if unit 
employees making such requests sought support from CSEA. 
Such a communication is inherently destructive of employee 
rights protected by §§202 and 203 of the Taylor Law and 
3/ 
therefore violates §209-a.l(a) of that Law.-
The Town also complains about the remedial order 
proposed by the ALJ. It contends that the order is unduly 
burdensome in that it requires the posting of a notice where 
merit was found in only one specification of the charge, 
other specifications having been dismissed. 
The remedial order is one appropriate to a finding of a 
violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Taylor Law by reason of the 
Superintendent's statement. That the charge contained other 
allegations which were not supported by the evidence does not 
make the remedial order less appropriate for the violation 
found. 
1/Compare UFT. Local 2 (Barnett), 15 PERB 1F3103 
(1982), and State of New York. 10 PERB 1f3l08 (1977). 
i/The Town feels that the notice is inappropriate 
because it does not inform the employees that other 
specifications of the charge have been dismissed. In this 
regard the Town does not fully appreciate the reason for 
the posting. In any event, it is not prevented from 
posting a full copy of the ALJ's decision or a supplemental 
statement which accurately reports the disposition of the 
charge. 
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NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER: 
1. that the exceptions be, and they hereby 
are, dismissed; 
2. that the Town cease and desist from 
interfering with, restraining or 
coercing employees within the unit 
represented by CSEA in the exercise of 
their rights under the Taylor Law; and 
3. that the Town sign and post the attached 
notice at all locations customarily used 
to communicate with unit employees. 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
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APPENDIX 
OTICE TO ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBUC EMPLOYMENT REUTIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Hempstead within the 
unit represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Local 830. AFSCME. Local 1000. AFL-CIO that the Town of 
Hempstead will not interfere with, restrain, or coerce unit 
employees in the exercise of their rights under the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
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This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2C-Vl5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF NORTH CASTLE 
Employer, 
—" and •-
BOARD DECISION 
NORTH CASTLE WATER & SEWER DISTRICT 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, AND ORDER 
Petitioner, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
LOCAL 8 60, 
-and- CASE NO. C-293 8 
TOWN OF NORTH CASTLE SEWER DISTRICT NO. 1, 
-and-
TOWN OF NORTH CASTLE SEWER DISTRICT NO. 2, 
-and-
TOWN OF NORTH CASTLE WATER DISTRICT NO. 1, 
-and-
TOWN OF NORTH CASTLE WATER DISTRICT NO. 2, 
Interveners. 
RAINS & POGREBIN (BRUCE R. MILLMAN. ESQ., of Counsel), 
for Employer 
SAL MISITI. for Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (WILLIAM M. WALLENS, 
ESQ., of Counsel), for Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 860 
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This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Local 860 (CSEA) to an interim 
decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) holding that persons who work for 
the Town of North Castle Sewer District No. 1, the Town of 
North Castle Sewer District No. 2, the Town of North Castle 
Water District No. 1 and the Town of North Castle Water 
District No. 2 are jointly employed by the Town of North 
Castle (Town) and the Districts, and that they should 
therefore be excluded from a unit of Town employees 
represented by CSEA.— 
The decision was issued following a petition by the North 
Castle Water & Sewer District Employees Association 
(Association) to decertify CSEA as the representative of such 
employees and for its own certification in its place. At 
present, CSEA represents those employees in a unit of blue-
and white-collar employees of the Town. Neither the Town nor 
the Districts have taken any position on the merits of the 
dispute. 
The Director resolved the issue before him on the ground 
that the Taylor Law compels separate units because some 
employees work for the Town and others work for the Districts 
U J . I U J.WWJ..L G u> €X j v J.11L- O l l l j ^ j . \j jr C j . • 
i/l9 PERB ir4001 (1986). It is an interim decision in 
that the Director has not yet determined the unit or units 
in which such persons should be represented in negotiations 
pursuant to the Taylor Law. 
1€3D9 
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Having decided to deal with this issue initially, the 
Director did not afford the Association an opportunity to prove 
allegations that might justify a restructuring of the units on 
other grounds. The Director's decision was made on the basis 
of a record to which all parties had been granted an 
opportunity to submit allegations of fact. Only the attorney 
for the Town — who subsequently indicated that he also was 
representing the Districts -- submitted allegations of fact, 
and neither of the other parties objected to these 
allegations. On that record, the Director determined that each 
of the four Districts was created by the Town pursuant to 
provisions of §190 of the Town Law as a special 
2/ improvement.— He further found that the Town Board had 
sufficient control of the budget and other affairs of the 
Districts so as to be a joint employer with them. Citing 
3 / . . 
decisions of this Board,— he held that employees of joint 
employers are entitled to be represented in a negotiating unit 
other than one which includes employees who work only for one 
of the entities that comprise the joint employer. 
2/Section 201.6(a)(iv) of the Taylor Law specifies that 
special districts and improvement districts are public 
employers within the meaning of the Taylor Law. In general, 
the statutory provisions relating to special or improvement 
districts which function on a town level are set forth in 
Article 12 of the Town Law. 
2/County of Orange. 14 PERB V3012 (1981); County of 
Schenectady. 14 PERB 1f3013 (1981); Albany County. 15 PERB 
1P008 (1982); County of Clinton. 18 PERB 1f3070 (1985). 
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The decisions cited by the Director all involve employees 
of sheriffs. The rationale for these decisions is most fully 
articulated in County of Clinton, supra, which explains the 
three standards for defining negotiating units that are set 
forth in §207 of the Taylor Law as follows (at p. 3153): 
The first community of interest standard 
clearly contemplates that a range of possible 
units would satisfy it. Accordingly, it must 
be evaluated on a relative basis. This is done 
by placing its implications in balance with the 
implications of the third standard. As noted 
by the joint employer in its brief, that 
standard "takes into consideration the 
administrative convenience of the employer and 
perhaps suggests that an excessive number of 
units might be undesirable." (Footnote 
omitted.) Thus, by its nature, it, too. 
contemplates a range of unit possibilities, 
with administrative convenience balanced 
against community of interest when the two 
standards point in opposite directions. 
The second standard is different. Where the 
employees all work for the same public employer, 
it can always be satisfied because the employer 
can always create a matching labor relations 
structure for itself. Accordingly, it is a 
variable factor to the extent that the public 
employer's current labor relations structure 
might have to be changed. But where there is a 
multi-employer unit, it can never be satisfied 
because there are no officials of the separate 
governments who function at the level of the 
unit with respect to the unit as a whole. 
Our conclusion — that the first and third standards lend 
themselves to a balancing test and the second standard does not 
— is true with respect to employees of sheriffs' departments. 
Our review of the Town Law provisions relating to special and 
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improvement districts persuades us, however, that it is not 
necessarily true of all such districts. 
Ever since the enactment of Chapter 634 of the Laws of 
1932, the governance of most such districts has been vested in 
4/ the town board of the town which created the district.— 
Some districts, however, are governed by boards of 
commissioners. This is true, for example, of fire districts 
and other districts which adopted appropriate resolutions prior 
5/ 
to June 29, 1933. But for the typical special or 
improvement district, it is the town board which is the 
6 / 
appointing authority of employees.— The record shows this 
to be the case here. In this, special and improvement 
districts are significantly different from sheriffs' 
departments in that sheriffs are the appointing authority of 
7/ the employees of those departments.— The significance of 
this is that, while special and improvement districts are 
public employers within the statutory definition of that term, 
they nevertheless lack any influence over the terms and 
conditions of employment of the employees. Indeed, their 
control over terms and conditions of employment is 
i/Town Law §61 and §190. 
5/Town Law §61, §341.10 and Article 13. 
6/Town Law §61. 
2/County Law §652.2. Moreover, a sheriff is personally 
liable for the actions of his civil deputies. Reese v. 
Lombard. 46 N.Y.2d 904 (1979). 
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significantly less than that of town highway departments, the 
head of which is an elected town superintendent of highways. 
Nevertheless, this Board has held that highway department 
8 / 
employees are properly placed in units of town employees. -
The 1969 report of the Select Joint Legislative Committee 
9/ 
on Public Employee Relations - supports the proposition that 
town improvement and special districts are different from most 
other entities defined as public employers by the Taylor Law. 
Appendix E of that report contains a listing of public 
employers under the Taylor Law and specifies certain 
information about each type of public employer. Under the 
general heading of towns, it contains the following entry: 
"Town improvement or special districts (not a gov. u n i t ) . " It 
further states that the chief executive official of such 
districts is the town supervisor and their legislative body is 
the town board. The parenthetic statement "not a gov. unit" 
means that such districts do not exercise normal governmental 
functions. Rather, they are designed to facilitate the town 
government's provision of special services to areas less than 
the full territory of the town and to assess the costs of such 
services against the residents of the town who will benefit 
8/Town of Ramapo. 8 PERB 1P057 (1975). 
.2/state of New York Legislative Document 1969 - No. 14. 
J 
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from them, i.e., those who live in the special or 
improvement district. 
We find further support for the proposition that 
negotiating units may be defined by this Board which 
transcend the lines of entities enumerated in §201.6(a) o 
10/ 
the Taylor Law in the Taylor Committee Report.— That 
document sets forth the legislative history of the Taylor 
Law. At page 55, it states: 
THERE ARE AT LEAST 8600 governmental employing 
entities in the State of New York the 
employees of which might conceivably desire to 
exercise the right of association for the 
purpose of negotiating collectively the terms 
of their employment and the handling of their 
grievances. These include 20 State 
Departments, the State University, 62 cities, 
62 counties, 932 towns, 553 villages, 1199 
school districts, 53 public authorities, 84 
housing authorities, 5540 special districts, 
an unknown but large number of city 
departments, and 21 urban renewal agencies. 
Moreover, many of these entities run special 
installations (such as hospitals, prisons, 
etc.) the employees of which have a plausible 
community of interest in collective 
representation. 
To assume that a single mode of collective 
participation for the employees of all of 
these entities can or should be established by 
state law would exceed the limits of common 
sense. As a matter of fact, an extensive 
range of arrangements for that collective 
participation has developed out of experience 
in satisfying the interests of not only 
employees, but also employee organizations, 
government agency executives, and legislative 
bodies. 
iO/Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, 
Final Report, March 31, 1966. 
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Here, the report refers not only to the entities which 
constitute public employers within the meaning of the Taylor 
Law, but also departments of some such public employers. The 
report then indicates that the employees of these entities 
have various plausible communities of interest, the 
implication of which is that, for some, alternative 
negotiating unit structures may be contemplated. 
This analysis leads us to the conclusion that the 
statutory definition of public employers merely specifies the 
entities that are subject to the Taylor Law, and that it has 
no necessary implications for negotiating unit structure. 
Those implications flow from the second standard of §207.1, 
as explained in County of Clinton, supra. However, while 
there are no officials of (1) a county and (2) a 
sheriff/county joint employer who function at the level of a 
negotiating unit comprising the employees of both entities, 
this is not necessarily so for special or improvement 
districts.— Clearly, it is not so for the four districts 
in the instant proceeding. Here, the second Taylor Law 
standard for the definition of negotiating units does not 
preclude the definition of units which integrate town and 
district employees. 
ii/lt may or may not be so for special or improvement 
districts, the governance of which is in the hands of a board 
of commissioners. 
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Inasmuch as the petition alleges alternative grounds for 
excluding persons who work for the districts from the unit of 
Town employees represented by CSEA which were not addressed 
by the Director, we remand this matter to him to consider 
those allegations. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is, remanded to the 
Director for further processing. 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
#2D-Vl5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent, 
and -CASE NO.- U^ -7-713 
WILLIAM J. SORRENTINO, 
Charging Party. 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY. ALBERT C. COSENZA. 
ESQ. (GEORGE S. GRUPSMITH. ESQ., of Counsel), for 
Respondent 
AGULNICK & GOGEL (WILLIAM A. GOGEL, ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Charging Party 
\ J 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
William J. Sorrentino filed the charge herein on 
September 25. 1984. It alleges that the New York City 
Transit Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of 
the Taylor Law in that it instituted disciplinary charges 
against Sorrentino in retaliation for his/exercise of rights 
protected by the Taylor Law, and that it prevented him from 
photographing suspected unsafe conditions at one of the 
Authority's facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
found that the Authority has committed an. improper practice 
as charged, and the matter comes to us on the exceptions of 
the Authority. 
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FACTS 
Sorrentino was a delegate to the Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA), the negotiating representative of police 
officers at the Authority's District 34. In that capacity he 
inspected a new facility to which District 34 offices were 
being located. Concluding that there were unsafe conditions 
at the facility, he notified the desk officer and other 
officers of District 34 and they advised him that corrective 
steps were being taken. However, three weeks later, 
identifying himself as a PBA delegate, Sorrentino notified 
the New York City Fire Department of these alleged unsafe 
conditions and he requested that a fire inspection be 
conducted. 
Identifying Sorrentino as the complainant, the Fire 
Department inspected District 34. but it did not substantiate 
his complaints. The desk officer then initiated disciplinary 
charges against Sorrentino. The first specification of the 
disciplinary charge was that Sorrentino's conduct had 
violated the manual of the New York City Transit Police 
Department by engaging in "[cjonduct tending to create 
adverse criticism". The second specification was that he 
further violated the manual in that he "[f]ailed to promptly 
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and properly report accident prone conditions".- After a 
hearing, the first specification of the charge was dismissed 
and the second sustained, with the recommended penalty of a 
two-day suspension. 
While the disciplinary charge was pending, Sorrentino. 
on the advice of his attorney, attempted to photograph the 
conditions at District 34 about which he had complained. He 
was ordered to refrain from taking these pictures and warned 
that disciplinary action would follow. 
The improper practice charge merely complains about the 
disciplinary action taken against Sorrentino related to the 
fire department inspection and the picture-taking incident. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ admitted evidence of other 
confrontations between Sorrentino -- acting in his capacity 
as PBA delegate, and later as a PBA trustee -- and the 
Authority. The evidence indicates a series of actions by 
Sorrentino followed by retaliatory reactions on the part of 
several supervisors. The ALJ noted that these other incidents 
evidenced animus towards Sorrentino by reason of his exercise 
of protected activities. 
In its exceptions, the Authority objects to any 
consideration of a grievance filed by Sorrentino in late 1983 
2/The relevant provision of the manual requires that a 
police officer who discovers accident or crime prone conditions 
should report such conditions to the desk officer. 
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on the ground that the event transpired before Sorrentino was 
assigned to District 34 and there is no proof that 
Sorrentino's supervisors at District 34 were aware of it. 
Thus, according to the Authority, that event cannot be used 
to establish that Sorrentino's supervisors at District 34 
were motivated by animus when they filed or threatened 
charges against him for his activities on behalf of PBA in 
connection with the fire department inspection or the 
picture-taking incident. The Authority also objects to 
consideration of events which transpired after the fire 
inspection and picture-taking incidents on the ground that 
they have no probative value concerning the issue of 
motivation at the time of the two incidents that are the 
subject of the improper practice charge. The Authority 
argues that there is no evidence that these two incidents, 
standing alone, were improperly motivated, in that Sorrentino 
did violate the police department manual and the Authority 
was privileged to bring disciplinary charges against him for 
such conduct. 
DISCUSSION 
We agree with the Authority that the event recited by 
the ALJ involving a grievance filed by Sorrentino before he 
was assigned to District 34 should not be considered in 
determining whether the supervisory employees at District 34 
were improperly motivated in bringing charges against 
10320 
Board - U-7713 
-5 
Sorrentino. There is no evidence that they had knowledge of 
that event. With respect to the events that transpired after 
the bringing of the charges, we find that they establish 
animus against Sorrentino related to his activities on behalf 
of PBA at the time when they occurred. However, they do not 
establish conclusively that the animus existed at the time 
when the disciplinary charges were brought against Sorrentino 
because that animus may have developed thereafter. 
Nevertheless, they are not irrelevant to the issue of the 
state of mind of Sorrentino's supervisors when they brought 
the disciplinary charge. Logic dictates that supervisory 
personnel of the Authority who took retaliatory action 
against Sorrentino for engaging in activities on behalf of 
PBA at a later time may well have been ill-disposed towards 
his filing a complaint with the fire department and 
attempting to photograph allegedly unsafe conditions, both on 
behalf of PBA. Thus, it is useful in helping us to resolve 
any doubts that we may have as to the Authority's motivation 
in bringing the disciplinary charge. 
Actually, there is little reason for any such doubt. It 
is clear, on the face of the disciplinary charge, that the 
Authority's intention in bringing the charge was to interfere 
with Sorrentino's bringing of complaints to the fire 
department and to restrain and coerce him for doing so. It 
is equally clear that the bringing of the charge 
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discriminated against him for the purpose of discouraging 
that activity. Thus, if Sorrentino's complaint to the fire 
department on behalf of PBA is protected by the Taylor Law, 
the Authority's bringing of the disciplinary charge was 
improperly motivated. For the reasons specified in the ALJ's 
decision we find that Sorrentino's complaint to the fire 
2/ 
department was protected by the Taylor Law.- Further, for 
the reasons specified by the ALJ, we also find that 
Sorrentino's attempt to photograph the unsafe conditions at 
District 34 were protected by the Taylor Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the decision of the ALJ and 
WE ORDER the Authority to: 
1. Withdraw the disciplinary charges preferred against 
William Sorrentino relating to his complaint to the 
fire department, and any disciplinary penalty related 
thereto; 
•i-Zlt is irrelevant that with respect to conduct not 
protected by the Taylor law the Authority may be able to 
restrict a unit employee from filing complaints about it 
that may create adverse criticism. Compare Board of 
Education of Grand Island v. Helsby, 32 A.D.2d 493, 4 PERB 
V4716 (4th Dep't 1971), aff'd, 32 N.Y.2d 660, 6 PERB T7004 
(1973). We find that the Authority's reliance upon Western 
Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation, 15 PERB 3078 
(1982) is not helpful to it. In that case, the statements 
u i a u c jjy m e Uiix u e l i i j J i u y c c W 6 L C U O L J-IJ-O U C C U 6 U uy l i l c i a ; . U L 
Law in that they did not involve terms or conditions of 
employment. Finally, with respect to the allegation in the 
disciplinary charge that Sorrentino failed to notify the 
desk officer of the unsafe condition, the evidence before 
us is to the contrary. 
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2. Cease and desist from prohibiting William Sorrentino 
or any PBA representative from investigating 
conditions affecting unit employees' safety at 
Authority facilities, or threatening discipline 
therefor; 
3. Immediately remove and destroy all reports and 
documents referring to Sorrentino's involvement in 
the fire inspection and picture-taking incidents 
which are maintained in Authority files; 
4. Cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, 
coercing or discriminating against William 
Sorrentino or any PBA representative for exercising 
rights protected by the Taylor Law; 
5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to post communications to unit 
members at District 34. 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany. New York 
-?&+c^/$M~. 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
UMUSZZ-. Zr 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member , 
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NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees In the unit represented by the Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association that the New York City Transit Authority: 
1. Will withdraw the disciplinary charges preferred against 
William Sorrentino relating to his complaint to the fire 
department^and any disciplinary penalty related thereto; 
/ 2. Will not prohibit William Sorrentino or any PBA representative 
from investigating conditions affecting unit employees* safety 
at Authority facilities, or threaten:diseiplin£ltherefor;.,.
 5 
3. Will immediately remove and destroy all reports and documents 
referring to Sorrentino's involvement in the fire inspection 
and picture-taking incidents which are maintained in Authority 
files; 
4. Will not interfere with, restrain, coerce or discriminate 
against William Sorrentino or any PBA representative for 
exercising rights protected by the Taylor Law. 
New York City Transit Authority 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2E-4/15/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NASSAU COUNTY LOCAL 8 30, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and- CASE NO.U-8434 
PAULA R. HAUGEN, 
Charging Party. 
PAULA R. HAUGEN, p_ro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Paula Haugen 
to a decision of the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director).' dismissing, her. charge against 
Nassau County Local 830,. Civil Service Employees Association 
(CSEA) on the ground that it is not timely. The charge alleges 
a violation by CSEA of its duty of fair representation in 
connection with a grievance relating to Haugen's dismissal by 
the Board of Cooperative Educational Services which employed 
her. 
The alleged violation is presented in narrative form which 
recites various actions of CSEA from April 15, 1985 through 
October 28, 1985. As the charge was not clear, the 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) assigned to the case asked 
Haugen to clarify it. She did so in an eleven-page letter 
which expanded the narrative in the charge. Some of the facts 
alleged therein occurred more than four months before the 
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charge was filed, others within that four-month time 
frame.— Some of the conduct recited may constitute an 
improper practice. Other aspects of the conduct could not. 
The ALJ was still not satisfied that the charge was 
sufficiently specific and asked her for further clarification. 
More particularly, he asked Haugen to specify the conduct of 
CSEA which constituted the claimed violation. Haugen responded 
in a letter which pinpointed the conduct she was complaining 
about. Those events all occurred more than four months prior 
to her filing of the charge. Accordingly, the Director 
determined that the charge was not timely and he dismissed it. 
Reviewing the record, we find that the narrative contained 
in the original charge and in Haugen1s first letter of 
explanation contains allegations of facts which occurred within 
four months of the charge, some of which may constitute an 
2/ improper practice.— 
•^ /section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure permits 
the filing of an improper practice charge within four months of 
the conduct complained about. 
2/Section 204.2(a) of our Rules of Procedure reguires the 
processing of a charge if the facts alleged may constitute an 
improper practice. We sympathize with the reluctance of the 
Director to process the charge on the basis of a long, 
nonspecific narrative which contains many allegations of fact 
merely because some of those allegations may constitute a 
violation. Ordinarily we would concur in his determination to 
rely upon the charging party's specific delineation of what it 
is that she is complaining about. Here, however, charging 
party appears pro se and is obviously unsophisticated in 
matters of law and the procedures of this Board. We are 
therefore unwilling to hold her to normal standards of 
precision in the drafting of a charge. 
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NOW. THEREFORE. WE REVERSE the decision of the Director 
and remand the matter herein for further 
processing. 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany, New York 
^Wg^g, f^Ht^c 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 
#3A-Vl5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF CROTON-ON-HUDSON, 
Employer, 
-and- CASE NO. C-29 94 
LOCAL 456. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS. CHAUFFEURS. WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS OF AMERICA, 
Petitioner. 
-and-
WESTCHESTER LOCAL 860, CSEA, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of 
America has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Parks Foreman, H.M.E.O., MEO San 1. MEO 
San 2, MEO Street, Laborer San 1, 
Laborer San 2, Laborer Street 1, Laborer 
Street 2, Mechanic, Water Main. Man Gr. 
1, Water Laborer, Main, Man Gr. 2, 
Intermediate Typist Account Clerk, 
Intermediate Account Cl/Typist, 
Caretaker, ParkingEnforcement OffM-eer-,-
Court Clerk, Bookkeeping Machine Operator 
and all other similar positions. 
Excluded: All other titles. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 456, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Flelpers of 
America and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: April 15. 1986 
Albany, New York 
jJOW^Kf^r^ CU\ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
/ , . * , -
Walter L. Eisenberg, Mem 
#3B-Vl5/86 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
SERVICES OF CATTARAUGUS. ALLEGANY, 
ERIE AND WYOMING COUNTIES, 
Employer-, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3035 
CATTARAUGUS. ALLEGANY. ERIE. 
WYOMING BOCES ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
STAFF SPECIALISTS ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
C A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Cattaraugus. Allegany, Erie, 
Wyoming BOCES Administrative and Staff Specialists Association 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by 
the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
\^_J grievances. 
-10330 
Certification - C-3035 page 2 
Unit: Included: All Program Managers, Supervisors. 
Building Facilitators, Coordinators, 
Assistant Program Managers and 
Assistant Directors. 
Excluded: District Superintendent, Assistant 
District Superintendent, Treasurer/ 
: -- A<toijiisira-t-iv-e--A-s-s-i-sta-n4^#o^r-----B-u-s-i--n-e-s-s--,--
Accountant/Assistant Treasurer, 
Director - Labor Relations and all 
Directors. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Cattaraugus, Allegany, 
Erie, Wyoming BOCES Administrative and Staff Specialists 
Association and enter into a written agreement with such employee 
organization with regard to terms and conditions of employment of 
the employees in the above unit, and shall negotiate collectively 
with such employee organization in the determination of, and 
administration of, grievances of such employees. 
DATED: April 15, 1986 
Albany, New York 
£> AL W I ^ P A-r A/e^~H* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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